In recent years, various formalizations of non-monotonic reasoning and di erent semantics for normal and disjunctive logic programs have been proposed, including autoepistemic logic, circumscription, CWA, GCWA, ECWA, epistemic speci cations, stable, well-founded, stationary and static semantics of normal and disjunctive logic programs.
Introduction
Moore's autoepistemic logic, AEL Moo85] , is obtained by augmenting classical propositional logic with a modal operator L. The intended meaning of the modal atom LF in a stable autoepistemic expansion is \F is provable" or \F is logically derivable". Thus Moore's modal operator L can be viewed as a \knowledge operator" which allows us to reason about formulae known to be true in some stable expansion 1 . However, often times in addition to reasoning about statements which are known to be true we also need to reason about those statements that are only believed to be true, where what is believed or not believed is determined by some speci c non-monotonic formalism.
For example, consider a scenario in which: You rent a movie if you believe that you will neither go to a baseball game nor to a football game; You do not buy tickets to a game if you don't know that you will go to watch it. We could describe this scenario as follows 2 : B:baseball^B:f ootball rent movie :Lbaseball^:Lf ootball dont buy tickets:
Assuming that initially this is all you know and that your beliefs are based on minimal entailment (circumscription), you will likely rent a movie because you believe that you will not go to watch any games (i.e., both :baseball and :f ootball hold in all minimal models) and you will not buy tickets because you don't know that you will go to any of the games (i.e., neither baseball nor football is provable).
Suppose now that you learn that you will either go to a baseball game or to a football game: baseball _ football: In the new scenario you will no longer rent a movie (because :baseball^:f ootball no longer holds in all minimal models) but you will not buy any tickets either because you don't know yet which game you are going to watch (i.e., neither baseball nor football is provable).
Finally, suppose that you eventually learn that you in fact go to a baseball game: baseball:
Clearly, you no longer believe in not buying tickets because you now know that you are going to watch a speci c game (i.e., baseball is provable).
Observe, that in the above example the roles played by the knowledge and belief operators are quite di erent and one cannot be substituted by the other. In particular, we cannot replace the premise B:baseball^B:f ootball in the rst implication by L:baseball^L:f ootball because that would result in rent movie not being true in rst scenario 3 . Similarly, we cannot replace it by :Lbaseball^:Lf ootball because that would result in rent movie being true in the second scenario 4 .
In order to be able to explicitly reason about beliefs, we introduce a new non-monotonic formalism, called the Autoepistemic Logic of Knowledge and Beliefs, AELB, obtained by augmenting Moore's autoepistemic logic, AEL, already employing the knowledge operator, L, with the additional belief operator, B. As a result, we will be able to reason not only about formulae F which are known to be true (i.e., those for which LF holds) but also about those which are only believed to be true (i.e., those for which BF holds).
The resulting non-monotonic knowledge representation framework turns out to be rather simple and yet quite powerful. We prove that several of the major non-monotonic formalisms and semantics for normal and disjunctive logic programs are isomorphically embeddable into AELB. In particular this applies to autoepistemic logic Moo85]; propositional circumscription McC80, Lif85] ; CWA Rei78]; GCWA Min82]; ECWA GPP89]; epistemic speci cations Gel92]; stable, well-founded, stationary and static semantics of normal and disjunctive logic programs GL88, VGRS90, Prz91b, GL90, Prz95b] . At the same time the Autoepistemic Logic of Knowledge and Beliefs, AELB, is signi cantly more expressive and exible than each one of these formalisms considered individually.
The proposed logic constitutes a powerful new formalism which can serve as a unifying framework for several major non-monotonic formalisms. It allows us to better understand mutual relationships existing between di erent formalisms and semantics and enables us to provide them with simpler and more natural de nitions. It also naturally leads to new, even more expressive and modular formalizations and semantics.
The paper is organized as follows:
In Section 2 we introduce the Autoepistemic Logic of Knowledge and Beliefs, AELB, and establish its basic properties. We also show that both Moore's Autoepistemic Logic, AEL, and McCarthy's Circumscription are embeddable into AELB. Section 3 is devoted to a detailed study of the Autoepistemic Logic of Beliefs, AEB, a sub-logic of AELB whose theories are limited to formulae which do not use the knowledge operator L. It turns out that the logic AEB has some very nice and regular properties.
In particular, any such theory has the least static expansion which can be iteratively constructed as the xed point of a natural minimal model operator.
In Section 4 we demonstrate that normal and disjunctive logic programs, under all major semantics, can be equivalently translated into theories in the logic AELB. This allows us to better understand the meaning of di erent semantics and their mutual relations. In Section 5 we show that also Gelfond's epistemic speci cations can be easily represented as special knowledge and belief theories in the logic AELB. As a byproduct we establish a simple duality relationship between the two operators appearing in Gelfond's logic. In Section 6 we illustrate how the meaning of theories in AELB can be adjusted by suitably changing the underlying non-monotonic formalism on which the notion of belief is based.
In previous sections we demonstrated that the semantics of AELB can be also changed by adding suitable axioms to the logic. Section 7 contains concluding remarks and a brief discussion of other applications of the logic AELB and of its relationship to other proposed logics. By an a rmative knowledge and belief theory we mean any such theory all of whose clauses satisfy the condition that l > 0.
Autoepistemic Logic of Knowledge and Beliefs
By a rational knowledge and belief theory we mean any such theory all of whose clauses satisfy the condition that n = 0.
}
In other words, a rmative knowledge and belief theories are precisely those theories that satisfy the condition that all of their clauses contain at least one positive objective atom. On the other hand, rational knowledge and belief theories are precisely those theories none of whose clauses contain any positive belief atoms BF i .
We assume the following two simple axiom schemata and one inference rule describing the arguably obvious properties of belief atoms:
(D) Consistency Axiom:
(1) (K) Normality Axiom: For any formulae F and G of the language K L;B : Remark 2.1 Strictly speaking, the necessitation inference rule (N) is not needed because it is automatically satis ed in all \stable" theories (more precisely, in all static autoepistemic expansions that are de ned in the section 2.2). Moreover, one can show that its omission results in the same \stable" theories. Analogous axioms (D) and (K) and rule (N) could be as well assumed about the knowledge operator L but they are also automatically satis ed in all \stable" theories and thus can be safely omitted.
A modal logic is normal MT94] if it includes the normality axiom (K) and is closed under the necessitation rule (N). In view of the above comments, one could equivalently de ne the underlying logic of AELB as a normal modal logic with two modal operators satisfying the (\no dead ends") Consistency Axiom (D). In the next subsection, we de ne static expansions of theories in this logic which provide a suitable meaning to the knowledge and belief atoms. We say that a formula F is derivable from a knowledge and belief theory T in the logic AELB if F belongs to Cn (T ). We denote this fact by T` F. Consequently, Cn (T ) = fF : T` Fg.
We call a knowledge and belief theory T consistent if the theory Cn (T ) is consistent. Clearly, T is consistent if and only if T 6 ?.
The following proposition will be frequently used in the sequel. 
The rst sentence states that beliefs are distributive with respect to conjunction, i.e., that a conjunction of two formulae is believed if and only if each one of them is believed. The second sentence says that if a formula is believed then its negation is not believed. The last sentence says that if we believe in a disjunction of formulae F _ G then we either disbelieve :F or we disbelieve :G.
The inference rule states that if two formulae are known to be equivalent then so are their belief atoms In other words, the meaning of BF does not depend on the speci c form of the formula F, e.g., the formula B(F^:F ) is equivalent to B(?) and thus it is false by (D). As we argued in the Introduction, in addition to reasoning about statements which are known to be true in \stable" expansions of knowledge and belief theories, we also need to reason about those statements that are only believed to be true, where what is believed or not believed is determined by some speci c non-monotonic formalism. Consequently, we want the new modal \belief operator" B of AELB to satisfy the condition that a formula F is believed in a \stable" expansion T if F is non-monotonically derivable from T:
T j= BF if T j= nm F;
5 Observe, however, that since derivability in a static expansion is based not only on the formulae present in the original theory, i.e., on the initial knowledge, when we refer to the operator LF as a "knowledge operator" we have in fact in mind a form of subjective knowledge. Needless to say, subjective knowledge can also be viewed as a form of belief.
where j= nm denotes a speci c non-monotonic inference relation. In general, di erent non-monotonic inference relations, j= nm , can be used, including various forms of predicate and formula circumscription McC80, Lif85] . In this paper we select a speci c non-monotonic inference relation, namely a form of Minker' McC80] which says that a formula F is believed to be true if F is true in all minimal models of the theory, i.e., if F is minimally entailed. In other words, we require that the belief atoms BF satisfy the condition:
T j= BF if T j= min F; (10) where j= min is the minimal entailment operator de ned below. Accordingly, beliefs considered in this paper are based on the principle of predicate minimization and thus can be called minimal beliefs.
We now give a precise de nition of minimal models of knowledge and belief theories and the minimal entailment operator, j= min . In the next subsection we de ne static autoepistemic expansions of knowledge and belief theories which precisely enforce the meaning of the belief operator B discussed above. Every theory has one inconsistent static expansion (which will typically be of no interest to us) and zero, one or more consistent static expansions. As we will show in the next section, a broad class of theories always has a consistent least (in the sense of inclusion) static expansion which therefore coincides with the static semantics.
It follows from the above de nition that a static autoepistemic expansion T of a knowledge and belief theory T is built by augmenting T with: those knowledge atoms LF for which the formula F is logically implied by T ;
negations :LF of the remaining knowledge atoms LF ; those belief atoms BF for which the formula F is minimally entailed by T and closing it under derivation in the logic AELB. Observe that since T appears on both sides of the equation the above de nition represents a xed-point equation. The rst part of the de nition is identical to the de nition of stable autoepistemic expansions in Moore's autoepistemic logic, AEL. However, as we will show, the addition of belief atoms BF results in a much more powerful non-monotonic logic which contains, as special cases, several well-known non-monotonic formalisms.
Note that negations :BF of the remaining belief atoms (i.e., those for which the formula F is not minimally entailed by T ) are not explicitly added to the expansion, although, as we will see below, some of them will be forced in by the Consistency and Normality Axioms (1) and (2). However, their status in the expansion can be easily determined by using the knowledge operator L, instead. Namely, from the formula ( 11) (see below) it follows immediately that for any static autoepistemic expansion T the following equivalences are true:
T j= BF T j= LBF T 6 j= BF T j= :LBF:
It is immediately clear from the above de nition that, like in Moore's AEL, for any formula F of K L;B and for any static autoepistemic expansion T we have:
T j= LF i T j= F: (11) In other words, LF holds in the static expansion T if and only if F is logically derivable from T .
Moreover, for any formula F of K L;B and for any static autoepistemic expansion T we have: T j= BF if T j= min F;
thus a formula F is believed in a static expansion expansion T if it is minimally entailed by T .
Consequently, the de nition of static expansions formally enforces the intended meaning of introspective atoms described in the previous subsection. In general, the converse of (12) does not hold because belief atoms may be forced in by the theory itself. For example, the theory T = fa _ b; Bag has a consistent static expansion in which Ba; B(a _ b); B(:a _ :b) hold and yet T 6 j= min a. However, in rational knowledge and belief theories, i.e., those in which belief atoms do not occur positively, the converse is also true. Intuitively, rational theories are those theories in which beliefs BF cannot be explicitly stated but can be only implicitly inferred by virtue of minimal entailment of the underlying formulae F. 
The above results precisely clarify the meaning of knowledge and belief atoms in static expansions of rational theories. We now return to the simple example discussed in the Introduction. in which you rent a movie, because you believe that you will not go to watch any games (i.e., both :baseball and :f ootball hold in all minimal models) and you do not buy any tickets because you don't know that you will go to watch any of the games (i.e., neither baseball nor football are provable). (Here and in the rest of the paper we list only the \relevant" introspective atoms belonging to the expansion T , skipping, e.g., Bdont buy tickets, LB:baseball, etc.) Suppose now that you learn that you either go to a baseball game or to a football game, i.e., suppose that we add the clause:
baseball _ football to T obtaining the theory T 2 . Now T 2 has a unique (consistent) static autoepistemic expansion: T 2 = Cn (T fB(bball_f ball); B(:bball_:f ball); :Lbball; :Lf ball; B:r movie; Ldb tickets; : : :g);
in which you believe you should not rent a movie. Indeed, we know that T 2 j= baseball _ football and thus T 2 j= B(baseball _ football). From (6), we infer that T 2 j= :B:baseball _ :B:f ootball. As a result rent movie is false in all minimal models of T 2 and consequently T 2 j= B:rent movie.
However, you still do not buy any tickets, because you don't know yet which game you are going to watch, i.e., neither baseball nor football are provable in T 2 .
Finally, suppose that you learn that you actually go to watch a baseball game. After adding the clause: baseball to T 2 , the new theory T 3 has a unique (consistent) static autoepistemic expansion consisting of:
T 3 = Cn (T fBbball; B:f ball; Lbball; :Lf ball; B:r movie; B:db tickets; : : :g);
in which you still believe you should not rent any movies but you no longer believe in not buying tickets because you now know that you are going to watch a speci c game. Indeed, T 3 j= baseball and thus T 3 j= Bbaseball. From ( 5) we obtain T 3 j= :B:baseball and thus rent movie is false in all minimal models of T 3 . Consequently T 3 j= B:rent movie. Similarly, since T 3 j= Lbaseball we deduce that T 3 j= min :dont buy tickets and therefore T 3 j= B:dont buy tickets.
As we can see, the static semantics assigned to the discussed knowledge and belief theories by their unique consistent static autoepistemic expansions seems to fully agree with their intended meaning. Observe, that we cannot replace the premise B:baseball^B:f ootball in the rst clause by L:baseball^L:f ootball because that would result in rent movie not being true in T . Similarly, we cannot replace it by :Lbaseball^:Lf ootball because that would result in rent movie becoming true in T 2 . We also cannot replace the premise :Lbaseball^:Lf ootball in the second implication by :Bbaseball^:Bf ootball or by B:baseball^B:f ootball, because it would no longer imply that we should not buy tickets in T 2 . Thus the roles of the two operators are quite di erent and one cannot be substituted 8 by the other. 
Embeddability of Autoepistemic Logic and Circumscription
We conclude this Section by showing that propositional circumscription and Moore's autoepistemic logic are isomorphically embeddable into the Autoepistemic Logic of Knowledge and Beliefs, AELB. In the following sections we will demonstrate that major semantics for normal and disjunctive logic programs (e.g., well-founded, stable, stationary and static semantics VGRS90, GL88, Prz91b, GL90, Prz95b]) as well as Gelfond's epistemic speci cations Gel92] are also embeddable into AELB.
Since the rst part of the de nition of static autoepistemic expansions is identical to the denition of stable autoepistemic expansions in Moore's autoepistemic logic, AEL, it is not surprising that AEL is properly embeddable into the autoepistemic logic of knowledge and beliefs, AELB.
However, the proof of this result is by no means trivial. Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of the result establishing the existence of a unique stable autoepistemic expansion of an objective theory Mar89] and thus it is only sketched in here.
Let T 0 = T and suppose that T n was already constructed for some natural n. Let: T n+1 = Cn(T n fLF : T n j= Fg f:LF : T n 6 j= Fg); where the F's range over all formulae which involve at most n levels of nesting of the knowledge operator L and the standard closure Cn is taken over the language L(H). It is easy to see that the theory: Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of the previous Lemma and thus it is only sketched in here.
Let T 0 = T and suppose that T n was already constructed for some natural n. Let: T n+1 = Cn (T n fBF : T n j= min Fg);
where the F's range over all formulae which involve at most n levels of nesting of the belief operator B. It is easy to see that the theory: Let T 0 = T and H 0 = H and suppose that T n and H n are already de ned. If n is even then T n+1 = B(T n ) and H n+1 = B(H n ), where B(T n ) is given by Lemma 2.5. If n is odd then T n+1 = L(T n ) and H n+1 = L(H n ), where L(T n ) is given by Lemma 2.4. Since T n+1 jH n = T n , for every n, the sequence of theories fT n g is non-decreasing. Moreover, each theory T n is consistent and satis es:
T n = Cn Hn (T fBF : BF 2 H n and T n j= min Fg fLF : LF 2 H n and T n j= Fg f:LF : LF 2 H n and T n 6 j= Fg): Let There must exist an n such that T n j= F and LF 2 H n . Then T n j= LF and therefore LF 2 T . Suppose that F 2 K L;B and T 6 j= F. There must exist an n such that LF 2 H n and obviously T n 6 j= F. Then T n j= :LF and therefore :LF 2 T .
As a union of theories closed under the axioms (D) and (K), T is also closed under these axioms. Suppose that F 2 K L;B and T j= min F. There must exist an n such that BF 2 H n . Moreover, as we show below, T n j= min F and therefore T n j= BF which shows that BF 2 T .
To see that T n j= min F suppose that M is a minimal model of T n and let M 0 be any model of T . Let N be an interpretation which coincides with M when restricted to the language H n and coincides with M 0 otherwise. Since T is obtained from T n by adding some (introspective) atoms, it is easy to see that N is a model of T . If N was not a minimal model of T then there would exist a smaller model N 0 whose restriction to the language H n would then be a smaller model of T n which is not possible. Thus N j= F which implies that M j= F and shows that T n j= min F.
In order to establish the opposite inclusion, it su ces to show that for every n:
T n Cn Due to the fact that T is obtained from T by adding some (introspective) atoms, for any formula F from H n we have that T j= F if and only if T n j= F.
An argument similar to the one used in the previous paragraph establishes that for any formula F from H n we have that T j= min F if and only if T n j= min F. This shows that T is a static expansion of T.
To complete the proof it su ces to prove that T is a unique static expansion of T extending T . If this was not the case then we would be able to nd a di erent static expansion T of T and the rst n such that T n T but T n+1 6 T . However, the existence of such an n would violate the uniqueness of the extensions L(T ) and B(T ), guaranteed by the Lemmas 2.5 and 2.4. } Theorem 2.3 shows that the restriction, AELBjK L , of the autoepistemic logic of knowledge and beliefs, AELB, to the language K L , i.e., its restriction to theories using only the knowledge operator L, is isomorphic to Moore's autoepistemic logic, AEL. Thus, as its acronym suggests, AELB indeed constitutes an extension of Moore's AEL obtained by adding the belief operator B.
The above result has a corollary showing that any consistent objective theory has a unique consistent static expansion. In any static expansion T j= F T j= LF , for any formula F. Moreover, since T is rational, it follows from Theorem 2.1 that T j= min F T j= BF , for any formula F.
Let F be any objective formula. Clearly, if T j= F then also T j= F. Suppose that T j= F and T 6 j= F. Then there is a model M of T in which F is false. Let N be any model of T and let N 0 be its modi cation obtained by replacing its valuation of objective atoms by the one from M. Since T di ers from Cn(T) only by the addition of some introspective atoms and since those atoms do not appear in T it follows that N 0 is also a model of T in which F is false which is impossible.
Clearly, if T j= min F then also T j= min F. Suppose that T j= min F and T 6 j= min F. Then there is a minimal model M of T in which F is false. Let N be any model of T and let N 0 be its modi cation obtained by replacing its valuation of objective atoms by the one from M. Since T di ers from Cn(T) only by the addition of some introspective atoms and since those atoms do not appear in T it follows that N 0 is also a minimal model of T in which F is false which is impossible.
}
From the above proposition we immediately conclude that propositional circumscription (and thus also CWA, GCWA and ECWA Rei78, Min82, GPP89] Let T 0 = T and H 0 = H and suppose that T n and H n are already de ned. If n is odd then T n+1 = B(T n ) and H n+1 = B(H n ), where B(T n ) is given by Lemma 2.5. If n is even then T n+1 = L(T n ) and H n+1 = L(H n ), where L(T n ) is given by Lemma 2.4. Since T n+1 jH n = T n , for every n, the sequence of theories fT n g is non-decreasing. Moreover, each theory T n is consistent and satis es:
T n = Cn Hn (T fBF : BF 2 H n and T n j= min Fg fLF : LF 2 H n and T n j= Fg f:LF : LF 2 H n and T n 6 j= Fg): Let T (S) = Cn (T fBF : S j= min Fg); where S is an arbitrary belief theory and the F's range over all formulae of K B . } Thus T (S) augments the theory T with all those belief atoms BF with the property that F is minimally entailed by S. We begin with the following easy observation.
Proposition 3.1 A theory T is a static autoepistemic expansion of the belief theory T in AEB if and only if T is a xed point of the operator T , i.e., if T = T (T ).
Proof. Theory T is a xed point of the operator T if T = T (T ) = Cn ( T fBF : T j= min Fg ) which is equivalent to T being a static expansion of T in AEB. } Consequently, in order to show that every belief theory has the least static expansion we need to prove that the operator T has the least xed point. We rst establish the (restricted) monotonicity of the operator T . Proof. Suppose that V 0 = T f BF s : s 2 S 0 g, V 00 = T f BF s : s 2 S 00 g, where S 0 and S 00 are some sets of indices, and let T 0 = Cn (V 0 ) and T 00 = Cn (V 00 ). We have to show that T (T 0 ) T (T 00 ). Since Cn (V 0 ) Cn (V 00 ) we can clearly assume that S 0 S 00 . It su ces to show that if T 0 j= min F then T 00 j= min F.
Suppose that T 0 j= min F and let M be an arbitrary minimal model of T 00 . Since V 0 V 00 and V 0 and V 00 di er only on the set of belief atoms and since minimal models do not minimize belief atoms, M is also a minimal model of V 0 and thus also a minimal model of T 0 . We conclude that M j= F and therefore T 00 j= min F. } Using Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 we can easily adapt the proof of the well-known Theorem of Tarski, ensuring the existence of least xed points of monotonic operators, to obtain: Theorem 3.4 (Least Static Expansion) Every belief theory T in AEB has the least static expansion, namely, the least xed point T of the monotonic belief closure operator T .
Moreover, the least static expansion T of a belief theory T can be constructed as follows. Let T 0 = Cn (T ) and suppose that T has already been de ned for any ordinal number < . If = + 1 is a successor ordinal then de ne 9 :
T +1 = T (T ) = Cn ( T fBF : T j= min Fg );
where F ranges over all formulae in K B . Else, if is a limit ordinal then de ne: T = < T :
The sequence fT g is monotonically increasing and thus has a unique xed point T = T = T (T ), for some ordinal . Proof. From Proposition 3.2 it easily follows that the sequence fT g is monotonically increasing and thus has a unique xed point T = T = T (T ), for some ordinal . This xed point must therefore be the least xed point of the operator T . From Proposition 3.1 we infer that any xed point of the operator T is a static expansion of T. Since the static completion of a belief theory T is obtained by augmenting T with the least possible number of belief atoms BF , it can be viewed as the most skeptical among static expansions (see HTT87]). Observe also that the least static autoepistemic expansion of T contains those and only those formulae which are true in all static autoepistemic expansions of T and thus, like Clark's predicate completion comp(P) of a logic program P, the static completion T of a belief theory T describes the static semantics Stat(T) of T.
Corollary 3.5 For any belief theory T, the static completion T of T coincides with the static semantics Stat(T) of T in AEB.
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The fact that the static semantics of belief theories in AEB can be constructed by means of the iterative minimal model procedure described in Theorem 3.4 is quite important. As a result, static semantics not only has an elegant xed point characterization but it can simply be viewed as the iterated minimal model semantics. The last fact is important from the procedural point of view. Namely, once a suitable procedure is devised to compute the minimal model semantics, it can then be iteratively applied to compute the static semantics. Corollary 3.8 (Greatest Static Expansion) Every belief theory T in AEB has the greatest static expansion which is always an inconsistent theory.
Proof. Let T = T f B(A^:A)g, where A is an arbitrary atom. It is easy to see that T is inconsistent. Indeed, since any theory logically implies A _ :A we infer that B(A _ :A) belongs to T . Consequently, by the Consistency Axiom, :B(A^:A) also belongs to T which shows that T is inconsistent. Since T is inconsistent, T j= A^:A, which, by Theorem 3.4, implies that T is a stationary expansion of T. } It is time now to discuss some examples. For simplicity, unless explicitely needed, when describing static expansions we will ignore nested beliefs and list only those elements of the expansion that are \relevant" to our discussion, thus, for example, skipping such members of the expansion as B(F _ :F ), BB(F _ :F ), etc. T 3 = T (T 2 ) = Cn (T fBF : T 2 j= min Fg); then we obtain:
T 3 = Cn (T fBCar; BDamaged; B:F ixed; BBroken; B:ShouldRun; : : :g): It is easy to see that no other belief atom of the form BL, where L is an objective literal, belongs to T 3 and that T 3 = T (T 3 ) is a xed point of T (we recall that for simplicity we ignore here nested beliefs). Consequently, T = T 3 = Cn (T fBCar; BDamaged; B:F ixed; BBroken; B:ShouldRun; : : :g) is the static completion of T. The static semantics of T asserts therefore that the car is believed to be broken, un xed and not in a running condition. Using Theorem 3.7 one easily veri es that T does not have any other (consistent) static expansions. } Example 3.2 Consider now the following belief theory T re ecting the anxieties of a guy living in Southern California who, while visiting Europe, was informed by a friend that apparently yet another disaster occurred in California. The European friend was not quite sure, however, whether it was an earthquake or res: L:Earthquake^L:F ires Calm because this would preclude the individual to be calm that unless he has a factual knowledge that no disaster actually took place rather than, as intended, just believe that nothing happened based on the lack of information to the contrary. } Remark 3.2 According to Theorem 3.6, in both of the above examples static completions are in fact obtained in just one iteration of the belief operator. However, in order to show it, one has to deal with nested beliefs and thus the explanation becomes a bit more complex. That is why we decided to illustrate a weaker fact that xed points are obtained in several steps of iteration. } Clearly, if we added :W orried to the previous theory T we would obtain a belief theory whose static completion is inconsistent because it implies both Worried and :W orried. The new theory not only appears to describe contradictory information but it also demonstrates that the static completion T of a consistent belief theory T may in fact be inconsistent 10 .
It follows from Theorem 3.4 and from Corollary 3.8 that a belief theory T either has a consistent least static expansion (i.e., static completion) T or it does not have any consistent static expansions at all, in which case its least and greatest static expansions coincide. However, it turns out that static completions are always consistent for a rmative belief theories, introduced in De nition 2.1. Proof. We will prove by induction that T , as de ned in Theorem 3.4, is consistent, for every . To see that T 0 = Cn (T ) is consistent it su ces to take an interpretation of K B in which all belief atoms are false and all objective atoms are true.
Suppose that we already proved that T is consistent, for any < . If is a limit ordinal then, by the Compactness Theorem, T must also be consistent as a union of an increasing sequence of consistent theories. If on the other hand = + 1 then: T = Cn (T fBF : T j= min Fg):
Since T is consistent, the class of formulae F minimally entailed by T also constitutes a consistent theory. De ne an interpretation M so that all the objective atoms and all the belief atoms BF such that T j= min F are true in M while all the remaining belief atoms are false. Clearly M is a model of T fBF : T j= min Fg and since it also clearly satis es axioms (1) and (4) it is a model of T . We conclude that T is consistent, which completes the inductive step.
} 4 Logic Programs as Knowledge and Belief Theories
We already know that Propositional Circumscription, Moore's Autoepistemic Logic, AEL, and the Autoepistemic Logic of Beliefs, AEB, are all properly embeddable into the Autoepistemic Logic of Knowledge and Beliefs, AELB. We will now show that major semantics de ned for normal and disjunctive logic programs are also easily embeddable into AELB. In the next section we will discuss yet another non-monotonic formalism embeddable into AELB.
Recall that by a disjunctive logic program (or a disjunctive deductive database) P we mean a set of informal clauses of the form are propositional. This assumption allows us to restrict our considerations to a xed objective propositional language K: In particular, if the original (uninstantiated) program is nite and function-free then the resulting objective language K is also nite.
Clauses (13) are informal because the negation symbol not C does not denote the classical negation :C of C but rather a non-monotonic (commonsense) negation. Moreover, the implication symbol ! does not necessarily represent the standard material implication . Various meanings can be associated with \not C" and \!" leading, in general, to di erent semantics for logic programs. We will now show that many of the proposed semantics can be obtained by translating the informal disjunctive logic program P into a formal knowledge and belief theory T(P) and thus assigning a speci c meaning to the non-monotonic negation not C and the implication symbol !. We argue therefore that the Autoepistemic Logic of Knowledge and Beliefs, AELB, constitutes a broad and exible semantic framework for logic programming which not only enables us to reproduce virtually all major semantics recently introduced for logic programs but also allows us to introduce new semantics, analyze their properties and study their mutual relationships. For a more extensive treatment of this subject the reader is referred to Prz95b, Prz95a, BDP96].
Stable Semantics of Normal Programs
Since Moore's autoepistemic logic, AEL, is isomorphic to the subset AELBjK L of AELB, it follows from the results of Gelfond and Lifschitz GL88] that stable semantics of normal logic programs can be obtained by means of a suitable translation of a logic program into a belief theory. Namely, for a normal logic program P consisting of clauses:
A B 1^: : :^B m^n ot C 1^: : :^not C n de ne T :L (P ) to be its translation into the (a rmative) knowledge and belief theory consisting of formulae: B 1^: ::^B m^: LC 1^: ::^:LC n A: The translation T :L (P ) is obtained therefore by replacing the non-monotonic negation not C by the negated knowledge atom :LC which gives it the intended meaning of \C is not known to be true". In addition, we replace the informal implication symbol ! by the standard material implication . 
Semantics of Disjunctive Programs
As we have shown above, major semantics proposed for normal logic programs can be naturally captured by means of a suitable translation of logic programs into knowledge and belief theories in AELB. We now extend these results to the class of disjunctive logic programs (see LMR92] for an overview of disjunctive logic programming).
In particular, we can extend the transformation T B: (P ) to any disjunctive logic program P consisting of clauses:
A T 2 6 j= min CR and T 2 6 j= min :CR . This leads to the conclusion that T 3 = T (T 2 ) = T 2 is a xed point and therefore the static completion T of T is given by: T = Cn (T fB(GA _ GE); B(:GA _ :GE); B:GB; BSM; : : :g):
It establishes that the individual is expected to travel either to Australia or to Europe but is not expected to do both trips and thus will save money. One easily veri es that T does not have any other (consistent) static expansions.
}
It is important to stress that Cancel Reservation is not a logical consequence of the static semantics T of the previously considered (translated) program T = T B: (P ). This follows from the fact that the static completion T does not infer 11 B:Goto Australia _ B:Goto Europe even though it derives B(:Goto Australia _ :Goto Europe). This re ects the notion that from the fact that a disjunction F _ G is believed to be true, one does not necessarily want to conclude that either F is believed or G is believed. In this particular case, we do not want to cancel our reservations to either Australia or to Europe until we nd out precisely which one of them we will actually not visit. In other words, we usually do not want to assume that the belief operator B is distributive with respect to disjunctions. However, one could easily ensure distributivity of beliefs w.r. Observe also that the de nition of static expansions and static completions carefully distinguishes between these formulae F which are known to be true in the expansion T (i.e., those for which T j= F), and those formulae F which are only believed (i.e., those for which T j= BF ).
This important distinction not only increases the expressiveness of the language but is in fact quite crucial for many forms of reasoning. However, if we wanted to ensure that a formula F is always true whenever it is believed to be true we could use the following:
Belief Closure Axiom: (BCA) LBF F , for any formula F:
This optional axiom states that if a formula F is believed to be true (in a given expansion T ), i.e., if T j= BF then F is in fact true (in T ), i.e., T j= F. This is a powerful rule which, in essence, erases the distinction between facts believed to be true (in the expansion) and those which are actually true.
Static semantics for disjunctive programs has a number of important advantages but it is not the only semantics for disjunctive programs that can be derived by means of a suitable translation of a logic program into the autoepistemic logic of knowledge and beliefs, AELB. For 
Adding Strong Negation to Logic Programs
The negation operator not A used in logic programs does not represent the classical negation, but rather a non-monotonic negation by default. Gelfond and Lifschitz pointed out GL90] that in logic programming, as well as in other areas of non-monotonic reasoning, it is often useful to use both the non-monotonic negation and a di erent negation, {A, which they called \classical negation" but which can perhaps more appropriately be called \strong negation" AP92]. They also extended the stable model semantics to the class of extended logic programs with strong negation.
It is easy to add strong negation to the autoepistemic logic of knowledge and beliefs, AELB.
All one needs to do is to augment the original objective language K with new objective propositional symbols \{A" with the intended meaning that \{A is the strong negation of A", or, equivalently, \{A is the opposite of A" and assume the following strong negation axiom schema:
(SNA) A^{A false; or, equivalently, {A :A:
Observe that, as opposed to classical negation :, the law of excluded middle A_{A is not assumed. As pointed out by Bob Kowalski, the proposition A may describe the property of being \good" while proposition {A describes the property of being \bad". The strong negation axiom states that things cannot be both good and bad. We do not assume, however, that things must always be either good or bad. Since this method of de ning strong negation applies to all belief theories, it applies, in particular, to normal and disjunctive logic programs (see also AP92]). Moreover, the following theorem shows that the resulting general framework provides a strict generalization of the original approach proposed by Gelfond-Lifschitz. Theorem 4.5 (Embeddability of Extended Stable Semantics) There is a one-to-one correspondence between stable models M of an extended logic program P with strong negation, as de ned in GL90], and consistent static autoepistemic expansions T of its translation T :L (P ) into belief theory in which strong negation of an atom A is translated into {A.
Proof. Easily follows from Theorem 2.3 and the results obtained in Prz95b].
}
The reader is referred to APP96c, APP96d, APP96b] for a much more thorough discussion of strong negation as well as explicit negation in belief theories. The notion of strong negation is used in the next section.
Epistemic Speci cations as Knowledge and Belief Theories
Epistemic speci cations were recently introduced in Gel92] using a fairly involved language of belief sets and world views which includes two operators, KF and MF, called belief and possibility operators, respectively. As an illustration of the expressive power of the Autoepistemic Logic of Minimal Beliefs, AELB, we now demonstrate that epistemic speci cations can be also isomorphically embedded as a proper subset of AELB, and thus, in particular, epistemic speci cations can be de ned entirely in the language of classical propositional logic.
We show that Gelfond's belief operator KF can be de ned as LBF and thus have the intended meening \F is known to be believed". On the other hand, the possibility operator MF is proved to be equivalent to :K:F , or, equivalently, to :LB:F . The translation provides therefore an example of a nested use of the belief and knowledge operators, B and L (see also the axiom (GCW A) in Section 4.3).
Due to the space limitation, we assume familiarity with epistemic speci cations. Let G be a database describing Gelfond's epistemic speci cation. De ne T(G) to be its translation into autoepistemic logic of minimal beliefs, AELB, obtained by: (i) Replacing, for all objective atoms A, the classical negation symbol :A by the strong negation symbol {A. We assume that the objective language K was rst augmented with strong negation atoms {A as described in Section 4.5.
(ii) Eliminating Gelfond's \possibility" operator M by replacing every expression of the form MF by the expression :K:F , where K is Gelfond's \belief" operator. (iii) Finally, eliminating Gelfond's \belief" operator K by replacing every expression of the form KF by the autoepistemic formula LBF .
The substitution (i) is motivated by the fact that in his paper Gelfond uses the classical negation symbol :A when in fact he refers to strong negation {A. The substitution allows us to reserve the standard negation symbol :A for true classical negation. The substitution (ii) is motivated by the fact that Gelfond's \possibility" operator MF can now be shown to be equivalent to :K:F , and, vice versa, KF can be shown to be equivalent to :M:F . The last substitution (iii) leads to a complete translation of epistemic speci cations into an autoepistemic theory of knowledge and belief. It replaces KF by the formula LBF with the intended meaning \F is known to be believed". Equivalently, its intended meaning can be described by \F is known to be true in all minimal models".
The following result shows that epistemic speci cations are isomorphically embeddable into the autoepistemic logic of minimal beliefs, AELB.
Theorem 5.1 (Embeddability of Epistemic Speci cations) Epistemic speci cations are isomorphically embeddable into the autoepistemic logic of minimal beliefs, AELB. More precisely, there is a one-to-one correspondence between world views V of an epistemic speci cation G and static autoepistemic expansions T of its translation T(G) into AELB. Moreover, there is a one-to-one correspondence between belief sets B of a world view V and minimal models M of the corresponding static expansion T of T(G).
Proof. The limited size of this paper does not allow us to provide all the details involved in the de nition of epistemic speci cations. Consequently, the proof of this theorem will appear elsewhere Prz96]. } Remark 5.1 It is important to point out that formulas in epistemic speci cations can contain existential quanti ers. However, since existential quanti cation in epistemic speci cations is dened by means of substituting all terms of the corresponding Herbrand universe for the quanti ed variables, it is completely equivalent to a (possibly in nite) quanti er-free theory. Consequently, the non-existence of quanti ers in AELB does not hinder in any way the generality of the above result. } Gelfond's paper contains several interesting examples of epistemic speci cations which now can be easily translated into the language of AELB.
Modifying the Notion of Belief
The proposed formalism of Autoepistemic Logic of Knowledge and Belief is quite exible and allows various extensions and modi cations. We have already seen that one can often ensure desired meaning of autoepistemic theories by adding suitable axioms to the logic AELB. Below we show that the meaning of theories in AELB can also be adjusted by suitably changing the underlying non-monotonic formalism on which the notion of belief is based.
In our approach we used the minimal model semantics T j= min F or the Generalized Closed World Assumption GCWA Min82] to de ne the meaning of our beliefs BF . In other words, F is believed if F is true in all minimal models of the expansion. As illustrated by the following example, by using the weak minimal model semantics T j= wmin F or the Weak Generalized Closed World Assumption WGCWA RLM89, RT88] instead and thus requiring that F is believed if F is true in all weakly minimal models of T, one can ensure that disjunctions are treated inclusively rather than exclusively. Due to the limited size of the paper the reader is referred to the above listed publications for the de nition of weakly minimal models. We conclude that under GCWA we can derive that both A _ B and :A _ :B as well as :C are believed, whereas WGCWA only allows us to believe A _ B.
} Both GCWA and WGCWA are very natural non-monotonic formalisms which seem to closely correspond to the intuitive meaning of negation in logic programs and deductive databases. However, they also share an important feature which in some applications domains may be viewed as a drawback, namely the fact that they both minimize only positive literals (atoms) thus leading to immediate asymmetry between positive and negative literals. If this feature of GCWA and WGCWA is undesirable, one can use some other non-monotonic formalism, naturally leading to a di erent notion of belief and thus to a di erent semantics. In particular, one can use a suitable form of predicate or formula circumscription which minimizes those and only those predicates (formulae) whose minimization is desired.
Conclusion
We introduced an extension, AELB, of Moore's autoepistemic logic, AEL, and showed that it provides a powerful and general knowledge representation framework unifying several well-known non-monotonic formalisms and semantics for normal and disjunctive logic programs. It allows us to compare di erent formalisms, better understand mutual relationships existing between them and introduce simpler and more natural de nitions of some of them.
Other applications of AELB include contradiction removal, abduction and diagnosis APP96a, APP96b]. In BDP96] semantic and syntactic characterizations of static expansions are obtained in special classes of belief theories which are then used in the implementation of a prototype interpreter for disjunctive logic programming. In BDNP96] these characterizations of static expansions are used to establish a close relationship between the static semantics and the disjunctive well-founded semantics, D-WFS BD95], of disjunctive programs.
The proposed formalism signi cantly di ers from other formalisms based on the notion of minimal beliefs. In particular, it it is di erent from the circumscriptive autoepistemic logic introduced in Prz91a] and the logic of minimal beliefs and negation as failure proposed in Lif92]. The proposed approach is also quite exible by allowing various extensions and modi cations, including the use of a di erent formalism de ning the meaning of beliefs and introduction of additional axioms. By using such modi cations one may be able to tailor the formalism to ful ll the needs of di erent application domains.
